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CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION:
THE NEXT STEP FOR
CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The tale of Arthur Andersen‘s demise can still bring chills to many in
corporate America. The entity‘s operational days are a memory, but its story
lives on as an infamous example of the stigma and nearly certain ruin a
criminal prosecution can bring to a business. 1 The lingering lesson from
Arthur Andersen‘s downfall is that indictment alone is a ―death sentence for a
large corporation.‖2 In contrast, the events leading up to the government
bailout of American International Group, Inc. (AIG) during the 2008 financial
crisis illustrate how avoiding criminal prosecution with the use of a deferred
prosecution agreement (DPA) does not necessarily avoid a negative result. 3
While the Arthur Andersen situation proves corporate DPAs help large
entities avoid the negative consequences of criminal prosecution, the result in
AIG‘s case demonstrates that deferred prosecution does not always achieve
the ethical reforms it sets out to accomplish. Thus, while deferred prosecution
can be a helpful tool for realigning businesses with ethical practices, the
current system is not efficient at implementing the necessary changes.
The goal of this Comment is to evaluate the deferred prosecution process
in the corporate context and to advocate for the passage of legislation to
regulate federal prosecutorial behavior so as to achieve lasting results from
corporate DPAs. 4 Similar to bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11 of
1. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the „New Regulators‟: Current Trends in Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 160 (2008) (acknowledging the ―severe
collateral consequences of indictment‖).
2. Lynsey Morris Barron, Comment, Right to Counsel Denied: Corporate Criminal
Prosecutions, Attorney Fee Agreements, and the Sixth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 1265, 1265
(2009).
3. In 2004, AIG Financial Products, led by President and Chief Executive Officer Joseph J.
Cassano, entered into a DPA with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to stay prosecution for an alleged
securities fraud violation. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Department
of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and AIG-FP Pagic Equity Holding Corp. (Nov. 30,
2004), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/aig.pdf [hereinafter AIG Deferred
Prosecution Agreement]. In 2008, AIG Financial Products and Cassano again became the subjects of
DOJ scrutiny as a result of the company‘s risky financial behavior. Jenny Andersen, A.I.G. Says It Is
Subject of Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at C3.
4. The fact that this Comment discusses federal prosecutorial reform in the corporate context is
not to suggest that businesses are more deserving of legislation that regulates prosecutorial conduct
than individual criminal defendants. While reform may or may not be needed in other areas of

876

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:875

the Bankruptcy Code, 5 which allows a corporation to reorganize rather than
fold in its attempt to pay off debt, giving a corporation the chance to right
ethical wrongs under a DPA in lieu of proceeding with an indictment and
prosecution can do a greater good for society.6 Both Chapter 11 and DPAs
help avoid the harsh results of a large corporation folding and leaving
thousands unemployed.
This Comment argues that the passage of legislation in the corporate
deferred prosecution arena will aid prosecutors in writing DPAs that
appropriately punish and deter white collar crime while avoiding collateral
consequences to businesses and employees. Legislation can allay the risks
inherent in today‘s deferred prosecution system, such as punishments that do
not fit the crime, pressure to waive attorney–client privilege, non-payment of
employee legal fees, and conflicts of interest in the appointment of a federal
monitor to oversee implementation of the agreement. 7
The balance of this Comment proceeds as follows. Part II will outline the
origins of DPAs in the United States. Part III will detail why legislative
oversight of prosecutorial behavior in the corporate deferred prosecution
context is necessary. Part IV will track the development of stricter
prosecutorial standards in DPAs by analyzing the provisions in three U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) memos and three corresponding agreements: (1)
the 1999 Holder Memorandum8 and the corresponding 2001 Aurora Foods,
Inc. pretrial diversion agreement,9 (2) the 2003 Thompson Memorandum 10

prosecutorial conduct, this Comment addresses only the corporate context.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (2006).
6. See Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities Law,
Corporate Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 M ARQ. L. REV. 979, 985 (2008).
Reorganization, like deferred prosecution, is useful ―in situations where . . . more could be recovered
by keeping a distressed business in operation than by dismembering its corpse.‖ Id.
7. See Dane C. Ball & Daniel E. Bolia, Ending a Decade of Federal Prosecution Abuse in the
Corporate Criminal Charging Decision, 9 WYO. L. REV. 229, 230 (2009) (explaining that legislation
is needed to curb the ―ongoing prosecutorial abuse by federal prosecutors directed at corporations
and corporate constituents under investigation‖).
8. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att‘y Gen., to All Component Heads and
U.S. Att‘ys on Federal Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html
[hereinafter
Holder
Memo].
9. Pretrial Diversion Agreement Between the Office of the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York and Aurora Foods, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/aurorafoods.pdf [hereinafter Aurora Foods Pretrial
Diversion Agreement].
10. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of Dep‘t
Components and U.S. Att‘ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan.
20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter
Thompson Memo].
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and the corresponding 2005 KPMG DPA, 11 and (3) the 2006 McNulty
Memorandum12 and the corresponding 2008 AGA Medical Corporation
DPA.13 Part V will demonstrate how the 2008 Filip Memorandum, 14 the
Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Acts of 2007,15 2008,16 and 2009, 17 and
two bills recently presented to Congress 18 evidence a desire in the legal
community for tighter regulation. Part V will conclude by urging Congress to
recognize the current trend in DPAs towards a more regulated standard for
prosecutors. Not only should Congress reintroduce and pass the two abovementioned bills, H.R. 5086 and the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution
Act of 2009, but it should pass additional legislation such as the Attorney–
Client Privilege Protection Act to form enforceable rights for businesses and
to more closely regulate the conduct of prosecutors in the corporate deferred
prosecution process.
II. THE ORIGINS OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES
A brief overview of the inception of the DPA is necessary to understand
the current climate. Recently, while administering the 2005 Bristol-Meyers
Squibb DPA for securities fraud violations, 19 federal prosecutors noted that a
main goal of the agreement was to ―achieve improved corporate governance

11. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the Office of the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York and KPMG, LLP (Aug. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/kpmg.pdf [hereinafter KPMG Deferred Prosecution
Agreement].
12. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of Dep‘t Components
and U.S. Att‘ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
13. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and AGA Medical Corporation (June 3, 2008), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/agamedical.pdf
[hereinafter
AGA
Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
14. Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of Dep‘t Components and
U.S. Att‘ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Filip
Memo].
15. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007).
16. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008).
17. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2009, S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009).
18. The two bills presented to Congress are the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of
2008, H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008) (reintroduced with identical language in the 111th Congress as
H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009)) and H.R. 5086, 110th Cong. (2008).
19. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney‘s Office for the
District of New Jersey and Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company (June 15, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf
[hereinafter
Bristol-Meyers
Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement].

878

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:875

and renewed market confidence without destroying a corporation and losing
American jobs in the process.‖20 The Bristol-Meyers Squibb theme resonates
in even the earliest diversion agreements, which generally did not involve
U.S. Attorneys or business entities. 21 Prosecutors first began deferring
prosecutions for individuals, such as juveniles or first-time offenders, with the
objective of allowing the individual to rehabilitate and re-enter society free
from the stigma of a criminal conviction. 22 Similarly, DPAs permit the
federal government to reform a business organization‘s unethical practices
without shutting down the business and thereby putting jobs and the economy
in jeopardy. 23
Pretrial diversion agreements come in two variations: DPAs and nonprosecution agreements (NPAs).24 In a DPA, ―the prosecutor files a criminal
charge against a company, but agrees not to prosecute the claim so long as the
entity complies with the terms of a deferral agreement.‖25 In an NPA, no
charges are filed at the outset but may be filed later if the corporation does not
fulfill the terms of the agreement. 26 Common terms of reform outlined in both
DPAs and NPAs include federal monitoring, ―restitution, fines, additional
auditing measures, termination of responsible individuals, and probation.‖ 27
Additionally, in both DPAs and NPAs, the government may proceed
criminally against the entity if the government believes the entity breached the
agreement.28
The first unofficial DPA occurred in 1992 and grew out of the
government‘s investigation of Salomon Brothers for a securities fraud
violation.29 The agreement was reached when Salomon Brothers complied so
20. P.J. Meitl, Who‟s the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate America, 34 N. KY. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (2007).
21. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 163 (noting that deferred prosecution has existed
for decades, beginning with deferred prosecutions for individual defendants).
22. Id.
23. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007). One
court described the consequences of a federal conviction for a business entity as a ―matter of life and
death.‖ Id. (quoting United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Diversion
agreements allow organizations to avoid the ―collateral consequences of an indictment‖ while
achieving institutional reform. Id.
24. Throughout this Comment the author will refer to DPAs, NPAs, and pretrial diversion
agreements interchangeably, as, though slightly different in definition, they are functionally the same
for the purposes of this Comment.
25. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 160.
26. Meitl, supra note 20, at 14.
27. Id. at 11.
28. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 161.
29. Id. at 163. See generally Paul Mozer, Plea Bargain Cited in Salomon Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1992, at L39 (noting that Salomon Brothers made substantial reforms pursuant to the
government investigation).
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substantially with the government‘s requests for reform that the U.S. Attorney
on the case decided not to indict.30
In contrast, today‘s DPAs, although lacking concrete direction from the
DOJ or Congress, involve a more formal agreement process at the outset,
which can be traced back to a 1994 agreement between the U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York and Prudential Securities.31 In exchange
for a deferral of its prosecution for securities fraud for three years, Prudential
agreed to the government‘s request for considerable internal reforms. 32
Unlike today‘s culture wherein DPAs are very popular,33 the Prudential
agreement was viewed as rare and unusual because it was one of the first of
its kind. 34 Similar to today‘s DPA process, the Prudential agreement was
made without much direction from the DOJ. 35
In 1999, the DOJ issued its first set of guidelines for federal prosecutors
engaging in diversion agreements. 36 The guidelines, entitled ―Federal
Prosecution of Corporations,‖ consisted of a memo issued by then-Deputy
Attorney General and current Attorney General Eric Holder.37 Since the
issuance of the ―Holder Memo‖ in 1999, the DOJ has used pretrial diversion
agreements to institute internal structural reform in over thirty-five business
organizations,38 and has issued three additional, significant memos containing
30. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 163 n.21. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice,
Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury
Securities
Case
(May
20,
1992)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211182.pdf. ―Salomon‘s cooperation has been
exemplary. Such actions were virtually unprecedented in my experience.‖ Id. (quoting then-United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Otto Obermaier).
31. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that Prudential Securities was the first
major company to engage in a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ).
32. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney‘s Office for the
Southern District of New York and Prudential Securities Incorporated (Oct. 27, 1994), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/prudential.pdf [hereinafter Prudential Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
33. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 166. The corporate fraud outrages of the 2000s, such as
the Enron Corporation scandal, pushed Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and President
George W. Bush to create the Corporate Fraud Task Force to investigate and monitor corporate
financial crimes. Id. at 164–65. The heightened focus on corporate crime sparked the increase in
DPAs. Id. at 166.
34. Kurt Eichenwald, Prudential Agrees to Pay Investors for Fraud Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1993, at A1 (noting that the Prudential settlement is ―highly unusual‖).
35. Meitl, supra note 20, at 12. At the time the Prudential Deferred Prosecution Agreement
was made no official guidelines for prosecutors existed. Id.
36. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 164. The guidelines ―outlined various factors that
prosecutors could consider in deciding the threshold question of whether to proceed against a
company.‖ Id.
37. Id.
38. Garrett, supra note 23, at 855. Large organizations with which the DOJ has entered into
DPAs since 1999 include American International Group, Inc., America Online LLC, the Boeing
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guidelines for prosecutors.39 Although each memo replaced its predecessor
with more stringent guidelines for prosecutors, the broad discretion initially
permitted under the Holder Memo has been difficult to retract.40
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN THE
CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION PROCESS
A. The Potential for Unfair Outcomes
The existing standards for prosecutors in the DPA process consist of a
series of memos issued by the DOJ to direct the prosecution decision. The
memos provide guidelines for ethical reforms of businesses but allow broad
prosecutorial discretion; therefore, the memos do not adequately address the
possibility that prosecutors may abuse their power in issuing DPAs and
NPAs.41
Unfairness may arise in at least four instances during the DPA process.
First, punishments placed on businesses may be unrelated to the crime that
precipitated the DPA.42 For instance, the Bristol-Meyers Squibb DPA, which
resulted from an allegation of securities fraud, required the company to endow
a chair in business ethics at Seton Hall, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney‘s law
school alma mater.43 While beneficial to Seton Hall, the windfall did not
advance the criminal justice system‘s goals of punishment and deterrence. 44
Second, if attorney–client privilege is waived, as it was in the Baker

Company, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Computer Associates, Inc., HealthSouth Corporation,
KPMG LLP, MCI, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., and Monsanto Company, among others. Id.
39. The Thompson Memo in 2003, supra note 10, the McNulty Memo in 2006, supra note 12,
and the Filip Memo in 2008, supra note 14.
40. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 245 (naming the Holder Memo‘s ―abuse-inviting
problems‖ as the reason the Thompson Memo failed to create proper guidelines for U.S. Attorneys).
41. Id. at 230 (explaining that legislation is needed to ―curb ongoing prosecutorial abuse by
federal prosecutors directed at corporations and corporate constituents under investigation‖); Spivack
& Raman, supra note 1, at 162 (advocating for legislation, or any change that would reform and
standardize the DPA process).
42. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 174.
43. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 19, at 6.
44. Similar criticism exists regarding distribution of uncollected consumer class action funds to
charities. Natalie A. DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed
Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 731 (1987) (noting the ―policy against
conferring windfall benefits on unaggrieved individuals‖). Because courts are ―free to do almost
anything with undistributed [consumer] class [action] funds,‖ the system is ―ad hoc, unpredictable,
unguided by any normative principle, and open to the possibility of abuse.‖ Goutam U. Jois, The Cy
Pres Problem and the Role of Damages in Tort Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 258, 263 (2008). If
left unregulated, the DPA system could grow to mimic the cy pres system and charitable
organizations may begin to lobby prosecutors to become the recipients of DPA funds. See id. at 265.
This process ―looks unseemly at best, and opens up the possibility of corruption at worst.‖ Id.
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Hughes, Inc. DPA, 45 unfairness may result if the government considers
privilege-waiver an element of cooperation, thereby giving businesses an
incentive to blame employees and ―find scapegoats within their ranks.‖ 46
Similarly, the third way unfairness can result from the DPA process is if a
business is pressured to cease contractually promised payment of legal fees
for specific employees.47 Such pressure was found unconstitutional in United
States v. Stein.48 While former Deputy Attorney General Thompson noted
that employees ―don‘t need fancy legal representation if they believe that they
did not act with criminal intent,‖ 49 others have criticized non-payment of legal
fees as an attempt to make prosecution easier for U.S. Attorneys and
cooperation more difficult for businesses by causing employees to distrust
their employers and refuse to share information. 50
Fourth, because the selection of a federal monitor to watch over a business
as it implements its reforms is unregulated, monitor compensation is often
expensive for a business, monitors may be inexperienced in the business
world, and monitor selection may not always align with the best interest of the
business. 51 For instance, U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Christie‘s appointment
of his former boss, past Attorney General John Ashcroft, to the position of
monitor for the Zimmer Holdings, Inc. DPA52 has been highly criticized
because General Ashcroft‘s firm stood to collect $28 million to $52 million
during the eighteen-month appointment period. 53

45. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and Baker Hughes, Inc., 3 (Apr. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/bakerhughes.pdf. Baker Hughes was offered a DPA
due to an alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation. Id.
46. Inna Dexter, Regulating the Regulators: The Need for More Guidelines on Prosecutorial
Conduct in Corporate Investigations, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 515, 526 (2007).
47. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 230 (listing the advancement of legal fees as a ―key area‖ of
unfairness); Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 169 (noting Judge Lewis Kaplan‘s holding in United
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), as evidence that prosecutorial pressure to
withhold legal fees can result in a constitutional violation).
48. 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
49. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 247 (citing Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors‟
Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1 (quoting thenDeputy Attorney General Larry Thompson)).
50. Id. at 247–48.
51. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 185–86.
52. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the United States Attorney‘s Office for the
District of New Jersey and Zimmer Holdings, Inc., (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1136869/000095013707014977/c19011exv10w3.htm.
53. Peggy Aulino, Deferred Prosecutions: Transparency and Accountability Lacking in
Process for Picking Monitors, Dems Say, 4 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) 467 (July 3, 2009).
―[M]embers of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law called [General
Ashcroft‘s fee] ‗outrageous.‘‖ Id. In addition, it is questionable whether Zimmer Holdings selected
General Ashcroft or was pressured by the government to select him as monitor. Id.
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Finally, in addition to the above-noted concerns, the question still looms
of when exactly a deferred prosecution is appropriate.54
B. With or Without Deferred Prosecution, Two Corporate Giants Fall
Due to the risks of abuse in the deferred prosecution process, public
skepticism surrounding corporate deferred prosecution has arisen in recent
years.55 While acceptance of a DPA may prevent the harsh consequences of
prosecution, a DPA may not always prevent a business from committing
similar ethical wrongs in the future, which indicates a problem with the DPA
process. The trouble becomes apparent after comparing the cases of Arthur
Andersen and AIG.
In Arthur Andersen‘s case, the DOJ offered the eighty-nine-year-old
accounting giant an opportunity to offset its criminal prosecution for its role in
the Enron Corporation scandal via a deferred prosecution agreement. 56 Arthur
Andersen refused to agree to reforms suggested by the DOJ, rejected the
DPA, and quickly fell to its demise in the ensuing prosecution. 57 In a matter
of months, the company went out of business and 28,000 employees found
themselves out of work. 58 The lasting lesson from Arthur Andersen‘s fall is
that indictment alone can ruin a business.59
The benefits of deferred prosecution for Arthur Andersen are now clear: if
the corporation had complied with internal reforms handed down from the
U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Arthur Andersen not only would have received an
ethical makeover, but it would have had an opportunity to right its wrongs

54. Meitl, supra note 20, at 2 (questioning the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion in
corporate affairs); Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 188 (calling for additional guidance from the
DOJ on when a deferred prosecution is warranted).
55. See, e.g., Editorial, It‟s Time to Put More Transparency into Deferred Prosecution Cases,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 25, 2009, at 19 (opining that the pretrial diversion process is
relatively unregulated and lacks transparency).
56. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 165. Arthur Andersen, while auditing Enron in late
2001 pursuant to a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, became aware of suspect
financial practices at Enron. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 248–49. In March 2002, after shredding
documents related to its representation of Enron, Arthur Andersen was charged with ―one count of
knowingly and corruptly persuading another person with intent to cause or induce any person to
withhold documents from or alter, destroy, or mutilate documents for use in an official proceeding.‖
Id. at 249. The conviction was later reversed on the Supreme Court‘s finding that the jury
instructions failed to properly convey the elements of the crime; however, the reversal did not save
the business. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005).
57. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 165; Floyd Norris, Execution Before Trial for Andersen,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at C1. Arthur Andersen was indicted after refusing to plead guilty to
obstruction of justice charges and many predicted the prosecution would contribute to the firm‘s
downfall. Id.
58. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 248; Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 165–66.
59. See Barron, supra note 2, at 1265.
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without the risk and harsh consequences of an indictment and criminal
prosecution.60 Under the DOJ‘s offer, Arthur Andersen could have avoided
the loss of ―billions of dollars in corporate value, thousands of jobs to
American employees, investor confidence . . . and the ultimate destruction of
[the] corporat[ion].‖61 For Arthur Andersen, deferred prosecution would have
been a more graceful alternative by providing ―deterrence, restraint, and
restoration,‖ while allowing the entity to stay in business, retain employees,
and continue with work that required institutional knowledge. 62
In contrast to Arthur Andersen, AIG accepted a deferred prosecution offer
from the DOJ as a result of a 2004 complaint charging AIG with aiding and
abetting securities fraud.63 As part of the agreement, AIG accepted
government supervision to rectify improper securities and accounting
behavior.64 Regarding the agreement and the reforms to come under it, thenAssistant Attorney General Christopher Wray said, ―‗[t]here is no place in our
markets for financial transactions that lack economic substance . . . .‖65
Despite Assistant Attorney General Wray‘s commitment and the close
government supervision of AIG implemented under the DPA, AIG suffered a
severe liquidity crisis in September 2008 due to a rapid decline in the value of
its credit default swap contracts that allowed purchasers ―to bet on the
creditworthiness of debt obligations backed by [subprime] mortgages.‖66 The
liquidity crisis caused AIG to lose billions of dollars, decreased the
company‘s share price,67 and contributed significantly to the 2008 worldwide
financial crisis.68 As a result of AIG‘s suspicious financial practices, in 2008
the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) launched an
investigation against the same AIG division led by the same person who
accepted the DOJ‘s deferred prosecution offer in 2004 for securities fraud. 69
AIG‘s situation illustrates the DPA process is problematic when a
60. Meitl, supra note 20, at 21–22 (acknowledging that a prosecution can be a ―death knell for
a corporation‖).
61. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 22.
63. AIG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 3, at 1–2.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, American International Group, Inc. Enters into
Agreements with the U.S. (Nov. 30, 2004) (on file with author), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/November/04_crm_764.htm.
66. Mary Williams Walsh & Jonathan D. Glater, Investors Turn Gaze to A.I.G, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2008, at C1 (explaining that home values fell, thereby forcing AIG to decrease the values of
the mortgages on its books).
67. Id.
68. Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Said to Be Stable, But Hurting for Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2009, at B1 (noting that when AIG‘s credit rating fell in 2008, its trading partners attempted to
collect on their contracts, which contributed to the financial crisis).
69. See supra note 3.
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corporation, such as AIG, can enter into an agreement with the government to
clean up its business practices but then continue to operate with questionable
practices and cause more serious damage in the future. 70
In sum, DPAs are controversial because, although they can allow
corporations to avoid an Arthur Andersen-like result via an agreement
mandating ethical improvement in lieu of prosecution, in the process federal
prosecutors have been given too much discretion to manage and rearrange the
day-to-day dealings of corporate America, and they do not always do so
successfully.71 There is no legal standard that (1) dictates transparency for the
DPA process, (2) answers why diversion agreements are offered for some
corporations but not others, (3) determines the appropriate level of
punishment, or (4) mandates how government monitors of the offending
corporation are to be selected or financially compensated. 72 Thus, while a
complete corporate collapse may be avoided with the use of a DPA, the risk
of an AIG-like situation exists under the current DPA process.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF HIGHER STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTORS
DPA critics note that the agreements, while imposing ethical reforms on
business entities, create ethical loopholes for prosecutors.73 The DOJ has tried
to close some of the loopholes over the years through the issuance of
successive memos, each memo replacing the last with new guidelines. 74
However, as this Part will show, through an analysis of three memos and a
diversion agreement under each memo, the memos failed to create
enforceable rights for the target businesses and, as a result, were unsuccessful
at achieving the necessary check on prosecutorial conduct to ensure
transparency and ethical conduct on both sides of the negotiating table. The
three DOJ memos analyzed in this Part are the 1999 Holder Memo, the 2003
Thompson Memo, and the 2006 McNulty Memo. The respective diversion
agreements analyzed under each memo are the 2001 Aurora Foods, Inc.
pretrial diversion agreement, the 2005 KPMG DPA, and the 2008 AGA
Medical Corporation DPA.

70. See Editorial, supra note 55, at 19.
71. See Meitl, supra note 20, at 10.
72. Editorial, supra note 55, at 19.
73. Garrett, supra note 23, at 857 (noting that unchecked federal prosecutorial power led to a
term in the New York Racing Association DPA that required the racing association to install slot
machines at its race tracks to provide public school funding).
74. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 166 (commenting on the replacement of the Holder
Memo with the Thompson Memo in attempt to find a more balanced approach).

2009]

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

885

A. Analysis of the 1999 Holder Memo and the 2001 Aurora Foods, Inc.
Pretrial Diversion Agreement
The Holder Memo aimed to guide prosecutors through the decision of
whether to indict a business entity;75 however, the effect of the Memo was to
deny businesses bargaining power over their agreements and allow
prosecutors to demand sweeping reforms from businesses so they could avoid
prosecution. Although the Memo did not specifically mention deferred
prosecution, it set out eight factors for prosecutors to consider in deciding
whether to proceed against a business. 76 Deputy Attorney General Holder
expressed in his introduction to the Memo that the factors were neither
binding nor dispositive. 77 Moreover, Deputy Attorney General Holder
acknowledged that the factors may change over time, and stated that
―[f]ederal prosecutors are not required to reference [the] factors in a particular
case, nor are they required to document the weight they accorded specific
factors in reaching their decision.‖78 Thus, while the Memo was useful in that
it gave prosecutors a starting point for the charging process, the Memo was
not specific to the deferred prosecution scenario, it did not provide predictable
rules for prosecutorial behavior, and it did not provide protection or
enforceable rights for business entities under investigation.
Among the most controversial elements of the Holder Memo was the
imprecise definition of ―willingness to cooperate‖ in the fourth factor. 79

75. Holder Memo, supra note 8, at intro. Deputy Attorney General Holder offered the Memo
to provide ―guidance as to what factors should generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision
whether to charge a corporation in a particular case.‖ Id.
76. Id. § II(A). The eight factors to be considered when charging a business entity as indicated
by the Holder Memo were:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense . . . ;
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation . . . ;
3. The corporation‘s history of similar conduct . . . ;
4. The corporation‘s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney–client and work product
privileges . . . ;
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation‘s compliance program . . . ;
6. The corporation‘s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to
replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers . . . ;
7. Collateral consequences . . . ;
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies . . . .
Id.
77. Id. at intro.
78. Id.
79. See id. § II(A)(4).
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Cooperation was controversial because the assessment of an entity‘s
willingness to cooperate depended in part on whether the entity waived its
attorney–client and work product privileges, whether the entity ―appear[ed] to
be protecting its culpable employees and agents,‖ such as by advancing
culpable employees‘ legal fees, and whether the entity engaged in sufficient
remedial actions.80
In addition, it was problematic for business organizations that
―willingness to cooperate‖ was only one factor in the charging decision. 81
Despite significant cooperation, the government could decide to proceed with
charging based on evaluation of the other factors in any order and weight, or
based on the prosecutor‘s own preference. 82 Thus, the Holder Memo has been
criticized for its failure to address deferred prosecution specifically 83 and for
its lack of direction regarding what constitutes an entity‘s authentic
cooperation with the government‘s investigation. 84
The 2001 Aurora Foods, Inc. pretrial diversion agreement, issued under
the Holder Memo, illustrates the criticisms of the Memo. 85 To begin, the term
―deferred prosecution‖ was not mentioned in the agreement, which was
reflective of the term‘s omission from the Holder Memo and shows how the
Holder Memo was not closely tailored to the DPA scenario. 86
Aurora, in trouble for accounting fraud, agreed to substantial changes in
its compliance program, such as hiring new directors at the DOJ‘s direction
and firing employees involved in wrongdoing. 87 Aurora acquiesced to hiring
an independent monitor who was ―mutually acceptable‖ to both parties, yet
the agreement lacked a definition of ―mutually acceptable‖ and lacked both a

80. Id. § VI(B). See also Ball & Boila, supra note 7, at 240. ―[T]he corporation‘s cooperation
may be critical in identifying the individual wrongdoers and locating probative evidence. As such,
the prosecutor should consider granting immunity or amnesty to the corporation in exchange for its
cooperation with the government.‖ Id.
81. Id. ―Of course, a corporation‘s cooperation with the government is no guarantee of
immunity or amnesty, and specific policies may still warrant prosecution regardless of the
corporation‘s willingness to cooperate.‖ Id.
82. Holder Memo, supra note 8, at intro.
83. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that the ―Holder Memorandum made no
formal mention of deferral‖).
84. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a PostEnron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM . CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1175
(2006) (quoting critics calling the Holder Memo ―a requiem marking the death of privilege in
corporate criminal investigations,‖ because it allowed prosecutors to demand almost whatever they
wanted, including a privilege waiver, as a marker of authentic cooperation) (citing David M. Zornow
& Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147–48 (2000)).
85. See generally Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2.
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time limit for monitor oversight and a cap on the cost of the monitor. 88
Unchecked appointment of a federal monitor is dangerous for a corporation
because the business and the monitor may not have the same business goals or
knowledge. 89
Further, Aurora agreed to waive its attorney–client privilege. 90 The
statement of waiver in the agreement limited the government‘s discovery to
information outside of litigation-related information; however, latter portions
of the agreement established that cooperation sufficient to avoid a prosecution
required Aurora to disclose all documents without hesitation, even those
subject to attorney–client privilege. 91 Waiver of attorney–client privilege
creates the risk that the business may turn over documentation tending to
―‗toss [employees] under the bus . . . to protect the company.‘‖92
Finally, the DOJ‘s unilateral ability to revoke the agreement and
prosecute93 severely limited bargaining power for Aurora. Thus, a business in
Aurora‘s situation did not have predictable standards by which to abide, and
much power was left in the hands of U.S. Attorneys to dictate immediate
disclosure, voluntary cooperation, termination of employees, a new
compliance program, and other terms of corporate governance reform. 94
The terms of the Aurora agreement, while unbalanced, were not as
inequitable as the terms of agreements that were to come. The soft standards
in the Holder Memo, such as the failure to address DPAs directly and the
failure to define ―compliance,‖ left great power in the hands of prosecutors,
opening the door to more relaxed standards in the future. 95 Agreements like
Aurora‘s, containing privilege waiver and nearly unlimited internal
restructuring, presented an easy way for prosecutors to accomplish corporate
ethics reforms while avoiding the hardships of a prosecution. 96 However,
88. Id. at 4.
89. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 184–86.
90. Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9, at 4.
91. Id. at 3–4.
92. Barron, supra note 2, at 1266 n.8 (quoting Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Ex-Prosecutor Dishes
Up Advice to GCs on Government Probes, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Oct. 17, 2007, at 4–5
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9, at 5.
94. Id. at 2–3.
95. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 246 (noting that the Thompson Memo ―greatly
intensified‖ the flaws of the Holder Memo).
96. Meitl, supra note 20, at 22.
Pretrial diversions then provide an alternative means for achieving
prosecutorial ends including deterrence, restraint, and restoration without the
imposition of severe collateral consequences on innocent victims.
Corporations who agree to a pretrial diversion can continue to do business, can
keep on [their] employees, and can carry on work that requires institutional
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loose regulations led to poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion.97 So-called
ethics reforms left businesses with little bargaining power so that punishments
often did not match the crimes, as is evident in the KPMG DPA issued under
the Thompson Memo.
B. Analysis of the 2003 Thompson Memo and the 2005 KPMG DPA
The vague standards of the Holder Memo allowed for broad prosecutorial
discretion and paved the way for the abuses that occurred under the DOJ‘s
second advisory memo, ―Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations,‖ known as the ―Thompson Memo,‖ issued in 2003 by thenDeputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson. 98 Unlike the Holder Memo,
the Thompson Memo was binding on prosecutors,99 officially sanctioned the
use of DPAs by referring to them specifically, 100 tried to clarify ―authentic
cooperation,‖ and aimed to standardize the terms of diversion agreements by
placing emphasis on evaluating a business‘s corporate governance program. 101
However, the Thompson Memo read more like an intimidating compliance
guide for businesses rather than a prosecutorial guide for government
attorneys.102 The two most significant and controversial features of the
Thompson Memo—(1) authentic cooperation and (2) corporate governance
and compliance measures 103—ultimately resulted in further entrenching the
Holder Memo‘s pattern of nonbinding guidelines and expanding prosecutorial
discretion, which became an accepted precedent and led to unbalanced DPAs
such as the KPMG agreement. 104
The Thompson Memo increased prosecutorial focus on two main areas:
(1) authentic cooperation and (2) corporate governance and compliance

knowledge.
Id.
97. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 230 (noting that aggressive prosecutorial tactics have led to
the need for reform in certain areas such as privilege waiver and advancement of legal fees).
98. See Thompson Memo, supra note 10.
99. Id. at intro. The Memo required that ―prosecutors and investigators in every matter
involving business crimes must assess the merits of seeking the conviction of the business entity
itself.‖ Id.
100. See id. § VI. Unlike the Holder Memo, the Thompson Memo referred to ―pretrial
diversion.‖ Id.
101. Id. at intro. (emphasizing that the Thompson Memo focused on: (1) clarifying authenticity
of cooperation and (2) ensuring compliance with corporate governance programs).
102. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 247 (noting that the factors in the Thompson Memo can be
easily stacked against defendants).
103. See Thompson Memo, supra note 10, at intro.
104. See generally Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 167. When the Thompson Memo gave
prosecutors more leeway, prosecutors began to demand confidential information from businesses to
stay prosecution. Id.
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programs. 105 The Thompson Memo presented nine factors similar to the eight
factors in the Holder Memo, with the addition of a new factor: ―the adequacy
of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation‘s
malfeasance.‖106 The additional factor relates to the Memo‘s first new
emphasis, authentic cooperation, and carries over an abuse permitted under
the Holder Memo—that prosecutors are encouraged to consider whether the
corporation revealed confidential communications of potentially culpable
employees as a marker of authentic cooperation. 107 A significant risk when
considering privileged information as a marker of cooperation is that it
encourages corporations to implicate employees. 108
The emphasis on a business entity‘s cooperation with the government in
the Thompson Memo was criticized for further expanding the power given to
prosecutors because it seemingly encouraged prosecutors to view waiver of
attorney–client privilege and nonpayment of culpable employees‘ legal fees as
markers of authentic cooperation.109 Surprisingly, the actual language
regarding privilege waiver did not differ between the Holder Memo and the
Thompson Memo. 110 However, the interpretation under the Thompson Memo
led to more aggressive methods for gauging cooperation because the
Thompson Memo, unlike the Holder Memo, was binding on prosecutors and
therefore required them to always consider all of the Memo‘s factors,
including cooperation, in the charging decision. 111
Moreover, cooperation became more influential as it was one of the only
factors that could be changed after the offense was committed. 112 Many of the
other factors for consideration, such as the nature and seriousness of the
offense, had already been set once the alleged crime occurred. 113 The strong
emphasis on cooperation and the fact that a business‘s level of cooperation
could fluctuate led businesses to voluntarily disclose information before the
105. Thompson Memo, supra note 10, at intro.
106. Id. § II(A)(8).
107. See Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 240 (acknowledging cooperation and voluntary
disclosure under the Holder Memo was a source of prosecutorial abuse); Wray & Hur, supra note 84,
at 1181–82 (conceding corporations may more readily offer up employees‘ misconduct if it will
fulfill the authentic cooperation requirement).
108. Barron, supra note 2, at 1266 n.7 (quoting Tucker, supra note 92, at 4–5).
109. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 247–48.
110. Both the Holder Memo and the Thompson Memo require from suspect business entities a
―timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and [their] willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of [their] agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney–client and
work product [privileges/protection].‖ Holder Memo, supra note 8, § II(A)(4); Thompson Memo,
supra note 10, § II(A)(4).
111. Id. at intro.
112. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1171 (noting that aside from cooperation, ―most of the
Thompson Memo factors are ones the company can do little to change‖).
113. Id.
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government requested it in attempts to cooperate to the utmost degree. 114
While advance disclosure could have reduced prosecutorial doubts about the
authenticity of an entity‘s cooperation, it was also risky, as the entity was
hedging its bets on the outcome that the government would find authentic
cooperation instead of prosecuting based on the heightened disclosure of
incriminating activity.115 Moreover, turning over privileged documents may
have seemed like a prerequisite to fulfill the authentic cooperation
requirement. 116 Without a standard method to calculate whether a disclosure
was too broad or too narrow to fulfill authentic cooperation, businesses were
left without a true measure of their progress toward avoiding the collateral
consequences of a prosecution, and most bargaining power was left in the
hands of the prosecutor.117
The Thompson Memo‘s second significant emphasis was on prosecutorial
evaluation of the target business‘s corporate governance and compliance
program to determine whether the program was effective not only on paper,
but also in practice. 118 The danger of allowing prosecutors to decide whether
to prosecute based on the quality of an entity‘s compliance program was that
not all prosecutors were experts in corporate governance and, thus, may not
have had the tools to properly judge whether the compliance program was

114. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 246. Corporations provided prosecutors with as much
information as possible ―all in hopes that the government hammer would not swing the way of the
corporation itself.‖ Id. at 248.
115. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1144 (noting that voluntary disclosure is a ―calculated risk‖
for a business). Fear of litigation following voluntary waiver of privilege was a ―major concern‖ for
businesses. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 246.
116. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1173.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1106. The Thompson Memo provided prosecutors with the following guidance:
In evaluating a compliance program, the Government will consider whether
the program is designed in a manner that can be reasonably expected to deter,
detect and disclose violations of law or regulation. Specifically, prosecutors
will ask the following questions:
 Do the corporation‘s directors exercise independent review over proposed
corporate actions, or do they unquestioningly ratify officers‘
recommendations?
 Are the directors provided with information sufficient to enable the
exercise of independent judgment?
 Are internal audit functions conducted in a manner that ensures their
independence and accuracy?
 Have the directors established an information and reporting system in
the organization reasonably designed to provide management and the board
of directors with timely and accurate information sufficient to allow them to
reach an informed decision regarding the organization‘s compliance with
the law?
Id. (citing Thompson Memo, supra note 10, § VII(B)).

2009]

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

891

effective. 119 The danger was exacerbated when a prosecutor‘s decision in one
case had potential industry-wide repercussions that could have unintentionally
set the standard for corporate governance and compliance programs across the
board.120
The KPMG DPA121 resulted from KPMG‘s $2.5 billion federal tax
evasion scheme, for which the DOJ filed a criminal tax case against KPMG. 122
According to then-U.S. Attorney Alberto Gonzales, KPMG was spared an
indictment to avoid the collateral consequences of being a convicted large
business entity, as were seen in the Arthur Andersen disaster.123 However, the
consequences of the resulting DPA, which followed the Thompson Memo‘s
emphasis on authentic cooperation and corporate governance, were severe and
resulted in a lawsuit filed by former KPMG employees in which the court
found the practices of the federal prosecutors on the case to be
unconstitutional. 124
The court rightly reasoned that the terms of the KPMG DPA were severe.
Under the agreement, KPMG ―agreed to shut down its entire private tax
practice, to cooperate fully in the investigation of former employees, and to
retain an independent monitor . . . for three years, in order to implement an
elaborate compliance program.‖125 The independent federal monitor was
Richard Breeden, a former SEC chairman, and the agreement did not limit the
time during which KPMG‘s cooperation with the DOJ was required. 126 As the
monitor, Breeden had expansive powers; for example, he had unlimited access
to KPMG information, such as e-mail, and the ability to hire a staff. 127
Breeden and his staff were paid out of KPMG‘s own pocket. 128 Finally, and
most controversially, in an effort to cooperate with the government and
implement a viable compliance program, KPMG terminated the employment

119. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1185–86. ―Business organizations are right to be leery of
the potential consequences of well-meaning but unsophisticated advice from criminal prosecutors on
how best to ensure legal compliance.‖ Id. at 1185.
120. Id. at 1185–86.
121. KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 11.
122. Garrett, supra note 23, at 862. In United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2004), the court enforced the federal government‘s summons seeking information regarding
KPMG‘s participation in alleged tax shelter transactions. Id. at 31–32.
123. Garrett, supra note 23, at 863 (noting former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales‘s
belief that ―the reality [is] that the conviction of an organization can affect innocent workers and
others associated with the organization, and can even have an impact on the national economy‖).
124. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
125. Garrett, supra note 23, at 855.
126. Id. at 864.
127. Id. at 865.
128. Id.
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of culpable upper-level partners.129
In response to the terminations, the government requested that, as a
measure of authentic compliance, KPMG withhold the legal fees of indicted
former employees, which was in contrast to KPMG‘s policy. 130 The
individuals at issue subsequently filed motions alleging that the DOJ
pressured KPMG into declining to pay their legal fees in an effort to fulfill the
cooperation requirement.131 The allegations were found to be true, as well as
unconstitutional, by Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New
York. 132 In United States v. Stein,133 Judge Kaplan held that the government
violated the KPMG employees‘ Fifth Amendment right to defend themselves
by burdening access to counsel, 134 and also violated their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel by conditioning acceptance of the DPA on KPMG‘s
agreement to withhold the legal fees. 135
Thus, while KPMG, in an effort to comply with government requests to
clean up, implemented an ethics program to prevent future wrongdoings and
terminated the employment of wrongdoers, 136 the government interpreted the
directions in the Thompson Memo broadly and took advantage of its powerful
position. This power play was evidenced by the request for nonpayment of
legal fees, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the waiver of
attorney–client privilege that risked encouraging KPMG to blame innocent
employees, the seemingly biased appointment of a former SEC chairman to
the role of independent monitor with unlimited power that risked a conflict of
interest, the agreement‘s indefinite duration, and the fact that the expenses for
the monitor and investigation all were billed to KPMG.137
The unchecked prosecutorial discretion that created room for the
questionable provisions of the KPMG DPA and Judge Kaplan‘s holding in
Stein directly led to the reforms regarding attorney–client privilege waiver and
advancement of legal fees as signs of cooperation found in the McNulty

129. John J. Rehmann, Note, Paying the Price: Should Corporations‟ Payment of Their
Employees‟ Legal Fees Be a Factor in Corporate Indictment Decisions?, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & P OL‘Y
379, 393 (2008). The KPMG firings were controversial because they illustrated the breadth of
prosecutorial power over corporate defendants; the nonpayment of employee legal fees that followed
the firings resulted directly from government inquiry into whether KPMG was obligated to pay its
employees‘ legal fees. See id.
130. Id. at 393–94, 394 n.72.
131. Garrett, supra note 23, at 865.
132. Id.
133. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
134. Id. at 356, 364–65.
135. Id. at 367.
136. Wray & Hur, supra note 84, at 1141.
137. See Garrett, supra note 23, at 863–66.
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Memo. 138
C. Analysis of the 2006 McNulty Memo and the 2008 AGA Medical
Corporation DPA
The result in Stein was a sign of major judicial backlash against the loose
principles of the Thompson Memo. 139 In response to dissatisfaction in the
legal community, 140 then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty issued a
new memo to supersede the Thompson Memo, known as the ―McNulty
Memo.‖141 The McNulty Memo tried to reform diversion agreement policies
regarding attorney–client privilege and advancement of employee legal
fees;142 however, as illustrated by the AGA Medical Corporation DPA, the
Memo‘s suggestions were not strong enough to create significant change. 143
The McNulty Memo retained the nine factors of the Thompson Memo by
which prosecutors made a charging decision.144 In an attempt to clarify how
prosecutors evaluated the authenticity of a business entity‘s cooperation with
a government investigation, the McNulty Memo added new language that
addressed the issues of waiver and advancement of attorneys‘ fees for
employees.145 For instance, before a request for privileged information could
be made, prosecutors had to determine a ―legitimate need‖ for the
information. 146 Legitimate need was based on four factors: (1) the likelihood
and degree of benefit the information would provide, (2) alternative means of
obtaining the information, (3) voluntary disclosures already provided, and (4)
the risk of negative consequences of a waiver to a corporation. 147
The McNulty Memo‘s procedure for obtaining a waiver of attorney–client
privilege was significant because it not only defined a legitimate need for the
138. Rehmann, supra note 129, at 395 (acknowledging the Stein court‘s finding that the
Thompson Memo did not provide the least restrictive guidelines for the KPMG DPA as evidence of
the court‘s discontent with the broad prosecutorial discretion permitted under the Thompson Memo).
139. Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 169 (noting that Judge Lewis Kaplan found that the
KPMG DPA, created under the Thompson Memo, resulted in a constitutional violation).
140. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at
C1. ―‗I don‘t know if there are going to be more or less prosecutions,‘ said Stephen J. Bronis,
[former] executive director of the white-collar crime committee of the American Bar Association,
‗but there are hopefully going to be less abusive ones.‘‖ Id.
141. McNulty Memo, supra note 12.
142. The Memo noted that the DOJ did not intend for its corporate charging principles to
discourage candid communication between employees and counsel. Id. at intro.
143. See AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13.
144. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at § III(A).
145. Id. § VII(B)(2)–(B)(3). The new language was meant to make it easier for corporations to
refuse to reveal privileged communications without the fear that doing so would lead to a
prosecution. Browning, supra note 140.
146. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2).
147. Id.

894

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:875

information, but it broke information requests into two tiers: Category I and
Category II.148
Category I information consisted of ―purely factual
information, which may or may not [have been] privileged, relating to the
underlying misconduct.‖149 Examples were copies of documents, witness
statements, and factual summaries. 150 To acquire Category I information, the
requesting prosecutor was required to ―obtain written authorization from the
United States Attorney who, prior to authorizing the request, [had to] provide
a copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney General for
the Criminal Division.‖151 If authorized, the request had to be communicated
to the business in writing.152 Although the McNulty Memo created more
oversight of privilege waivers by involving additional DOJ actors in the
process, U.S. Attorneys could still consider the business‘s response to a
request for Category I information in evaluating the business‘s overall
cooperation with the government.153
Category II information consisted of ―attorney–client communications or
non-factual attorney work product,‖ such as ―legal advice given to the
corporation before, during, and after the underlying misconduct occurred.‖ 154
Category II information could be requested only in the ―rare circumstances‖
that Category I information did not yield a satisfactory result. 155 To acquire
Category II information, the prosecutor had to ―obtain written authorization
from the Deputy Attorney General.‖156 In addition, and importantly, a
business‘s refusal to divulge Category II information could not factor into a
prosecutor‘s decision regarding whether the business substantially complied
with the government‘s requests.157
The addition of Category I and Category II information to the DOJ
guidelines was noteworthy because it acknowledged what was already
happening—prosecutors, while supposedly restricted to requests for factual
148. Id. Then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales supported creation of the two categories,
asserting that ―[p]rivilege waivers will not be sought without internal process within the department,
and will not be sought without need.‖ Lynnley Browning, Some Lawyers Urge More Safeguards on
Rights in Corporate Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at C3. However, critics called the
approach a ―multitiered procedure for requesting business entities to disclose protected materials.‖
Id. (quoting William M. Sullivan, Jr., a criminal defense lawyer at Winston & Strawn LLP).
149. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2).
150. Id.
151. William M. Sullivan, Jr., The McNulty Memorandum: New DOJ Policies on Attorney–
Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product Protections, 15 METROPOLITAN. CORP. COUNS. 34
col. 3.
152. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

2009]

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

895

information under the Thompson Memo, were actually requesting Category II
information before the information was labeled as such. 158
The McNulty Memo took another bold step in the direction of DPA
process reform; it instructed prosecutors to disregard whether a corporation
was paying the legal fees for employees accused of wrongdoing as a lack of
cooperation. 159 The Memo made an exception, however, for cases where ―the
totality of the circumstances show[ed] that [advancement of attorney‘s fees]
was intended to impede a criminal investigation.‖160 Thus, the McNulty
Memo was a stark shift away from the practices regarding legal fees under the
Thompson Memo, where payment of legal fees for employees accused of
wrongdoing was generally viewed as noncompliance with government
requests for reform. 161
Overall, the McNulty Memo supported more reasonable practices, starting
with the statements in its first paragraph. The first opening lines of the
McNulty Memo reminded both prosecutors and corporate leaders of their
duties, cautioning that ―[d]irectors and officers owe . . . duties of honest
dealing to the investing public,‖ 162 and stating that federal prosecutors should
―recognize that they must maintain public confidence in the way in which
they exercise their charging discretion [as] professionalism and civility have
always played an important part in putting [the DOJ‘s] principles into
action.‖163
In the DOJ‘s search for ethics, the McNulty Memo helped revise two
areas of prosecutorial abuse of discretion in the DPA process: (1) attorney–
client privilege and (2) advancement of attorney‘s fees.164 Although the
McNulty Memo neglected to address selection of federal corporate monitors,
the need for judicial oversight, ensuring punishments fit the crime, and a host
of other issues that arise in the DPA process, the McNulty Memo was a step
in the right direction toward increased transparency on both ends of the
bargaining process. 165 The progress was evident, but slow, as demonstrated
158. See, e.g., Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9, at 5. The full
disclosure required in the Aurora Pretrial Diversion Agreement is an example of a request for
Category II information before considering whether the request is satisfied by Category I
information.
159. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(3).
160. Id. n.3.
161. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 1, at 167. When the Thompson Memo gave
prosecutors more leeway, prosecutors began to demand confidential information from businesses to
stay prosecution. Id.
162. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § I.
163. Id.
164. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 254–55.
165. Id. at 256 (noting the mixed reaction to the McNulty Memo). See also Browning, supra
note 140, at C4 (quoting New York City attorneys who were skeptical that the McNulty Memo
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through the terms of the 2008 AGA Medical Corporation DPA.166
The AGA Medical Corporation DPA, resulting from AGA‘s alleged
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),167 followed the
McNulty Memo‘s prerogative that the government achieve its reforms in the
―least intrusive‖ manner because the DPA contained terms that were more
equitable than the terms in past agreements.168 First, unlike the KPMG DPA,
the AGA Medical Corporation DPA contained a set end date for both the
agreement and for monitor oversight—three years and seven days from the date
on which the agreement was signed by all parties, subject to a one-year
extension at the government‘s discretion.169 Second, the agreement established
a process for selection of the independent federal monitor,170 as opposed to
allowing a blanket appointment of the federal monitor by the government.
Under the AGA Medical Corporation DPA, the company would propose a
monitor that matched criteria set by the government, such as the ability to be
objective and experience in the applicable area of fraud and compliance
policies, and then the government would approve or deny the choice. 171
Compared to the Aurora agreement, which had no set end date clarification on
the process of monitor selection or monitor qualification,172 the AGA agreement
was more evenhanded because it involved AGA in the bargaining process.
Furthermore, unlike the KPMG agreement, the terms of the AGA
agreement were more proportional to the crime. Because AGA was accused
of violating the FCPA, the agreement mandated that AGA implement a
compliance program aimed at preventing and detecting future FCPA
violations and other anti-corruption laws.173 The focus on a revised
compliance program was a remnant from the Thompson Memo‘s emphasis on
compliance programs, and here, the compliance program was appropriately
linked to the crime.
Although the AGA Medical Corporation DPA evidenced progress, it was
not cured of imbalances, especially regarding attorney–client privileged
information. AGA‘s limited bargaining ability was seen in an express clause
permitting AGA to refuse to disclose privileged information upon ―a valid
claim of attorney–client privilege or application of the attorney work-product
would be able to achieve the desired reforms without the force of law).
166. See AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13.
167. Id. at 1.
168. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, § VII(B)(2). See generally AGA Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, supra note 13.
169. AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13, at 2.
170. Id. at 8–9.
171. Id.
172. See Aurora Foods Pretrial Diversion Agreement, supra note 9.
173. AGA Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 13, at 7.
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doctrine.‖174 However, in direct opposition to the requirements of the
McNulty Memo, the agreement permitted the government to take
nondisclosure into account when determining substantial compliance. 175
Furthermore, there was no mention of how advancement of attorneys fees
would be handled or viewed by the government, which was one of the key
reforms the McNulty Memo intended to make. 176 Thus, the AGA Medical
Corporation DPA illustrates that, although each successive DOJ memo has
made progress toward more equitable bargaining, the memos do not provide
enforceable causes of action for business entities and thus cannot go as far as
congressional legislation can to create equity in the DPA process. 177
The 2008 Filip Memo created slightly more bargaining room for business
entities; however, the real shift should come from Congress with the passage
of the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act, the Accountability in
Deferred Prosecution Act, and H.R. 5086.
V. THE SHIFT TO INCREASED REGULATION OF CORPORATE DEFERRED
PROSECUTION PROCEDURES
The 2008 Filip Memo, the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of
2009, the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, and H.R. 5086
demonstrate the desire in the legal community to tighten the regulation on the
prosecutorial side of the DPA process in order to achieve greater fairness in
DPAs through increased predictability and heightened ethical rules for
prosecutors.178 This Part will address the progression of heightened
prosecutorial standards and will advocate that the stricter standards in the
Filip Memo are a good start, but true improvements to the DPA process will
come from Congress‘s passage of the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection
Act, the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, and H.R. 5086.
A. The 2008 Filip Memorandum
In response to criticism that the McNulty Memo did not sufficiently solve
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id.
176. Ball & Bolia, supra note 7, at 254–55 (noting that the McNulty Memo offered new
guidance in regard to advancement of legal fees).
177. Letter from Former United States Attorneys to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
S. Judiciary Comm., (June 20, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://federalevidence.com/
pdf/2008/06-June/USAtty_LeahyLttr6-23-2008.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter]. Thirty-three
former U.S. Attorneys signed a letter addressed to Senator Leahy and his colleagues on the Senate
Judiciary Committee to urge the senators to support the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of
2007 because the former prosecutors believed the McNulty Memo, without the force of law, was
insufficient to achieve privilege reforms.
178. The June 2008 U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter from thirty-three former prosecutors also supports
the trend toward tighter regulation. See id.
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the problems with prosecutorial requests for waiver of attorney–client
privilege, 179 the Filip Memo, issued by former Deputy Attorney General Mark
R. Filip in 2008 to replace the McNulty Memo, contributes to the trend
toward stricter regulations for prosecutors entering the DPA process by
prohibiting attorney–client privilege waiver as a component of the
prosecutor‘s evaluation of a business entity‘s authentic cooperation. 180
Instead, the Filip Memo requires prosecutors to measure cooperation by the
extent to which the entity timely and voluntarily discloses the ―relevant facts‖
concerning the misconduct. 181 In addition, the Filip Memo is incorporated
into the United States Attorneys‘ Manual, an internal DOJ document that
guides the work of DOJ employees but does not have the force of law. 182
Although the Filip Memo is a step towards greater fairness in the DPA
process because it limits prosecutorial requests for attorney–client privileged
information, it does not altogether do away with prosecutors doling out
mitigating credits for cooperation.183 Therefore, it leaves potential for
confusion in the definition of authentic cooperation, which was the difficulty
under the Thompson Memo. 184
Further, it is likely that any agreement to come under a DOJ memo would
risk ethical abuses. DOJ directives, while supposedly binding on prosecutors,
179. Robert J. Kipnees & Khizar A. Sheikh, The Investigation and Prosecution of Business
Organizations, 16 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 49 (2008). See, e.g., U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra
note 177, at 3.
The 2006 McNulty Memorandum, which was heralded as a much-needed fix
to the 2003 Thompson Memorandum, is inadequate . . . . [T]he Memo
provides oversight of privilege waiver requests by the U.S. Attorney or Main
Justice. However, a report written by the Honorable E. Norman Veasey,
former Chief Justice of the state of Delaware, found that prosecutors in the
field are still requesting or demanding privilege waivers without the
supervision required by the McNulty Memorandum.
Id. The danger of privilege waiver is that it may encourage businesses to seek out employee
scapegoats. Barron, supra note 2, at 1266 nn.7–8 (citing Tucker, supra note 92, at 4–5).
180. Filip Memo, supra note 14, § 9-28.710
181. Id. § 9-28.720.
182. United States Attorneys‘ Manual, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usam/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). The Filip Memo is incorporated as §§ 9-28.000–9-28.1300.
183. Former Deputy Attorney General McNulty criticized the Filip Memo saying, ―there is still
a pressure to waive attorney–client privilege if you have ‗relevant factual information‘ covered by
attorney–client privilege that the government wants to get. And quite a bit of ‗relevant factual
information‘ is subject to privilege claims.‖ Brian Baxter, With Thompson Trashed and McNulty
Moot, Filip Memo‟s Time Has Come, AM LAW DAILY, Aug. 28, 2008,
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/08/with-thompson-t.html.
184. See Kipnees & Sheikh, supra note 179, at 49; Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip
Memorandum: Does It Go Far Enough?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 2008, at 4, 9. The problem with the
Filip Memo‘s definition of authentic cooperation is that ―relevant facts‖ may also be privileged
information, or may be work product. Stein & Levine, supra. Thus, businesses may often end up
waiving privilege to provide the government the relevant information it requires. Id.
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do not create rights for business entities and do not have the force of law
behind them. 185 In addition, the memos do not apply to all federal agencies;
they apply only to the DOJ.186 Thus, when prosecutors disregard memo
provisions, business entities have no legal recourse, unless, as seen in the
KPMG scenario, in violating memo provisions, prosecutors also violate law.
Despite the DOJ‘s reforms under each successive memo, the reforms have
not implemented sufficient improvement in the areas of attorney–client
privilege waivers, punishments that may be unrelated to the alleged crime,
non-payment of employee legal fees, and problems with monitor selection
such as a conflict of interest or lack of business experience. Thus,
congressional action is needed to create enforceable rights for business
entities in DPA negotiations. 187
B. Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Acts of 2007, 2008, and 2009
Attorney–client privilege is an esteemed principle of the U.S. justice
system, and it plays a prominent role in corporate criminal liability. 188
Without attorney–client privilege, corporate compliance programs would be
less effective as employees may fear disclosure of protected information and
be reluctant to report problems and seek advice; ultimately, the necessary
lucidity between a business entity‘s legal department and the entity‘s
employees would disappear.189
185. U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra note 177, at 3. ―The time has come to pass legislation that
protects the existing rights of individual employees and business organizations.‖ Id.
186. Id. Agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States
Department of Housing and Development, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
Environmental Protection Agency all have policies similar to the DOJ‘s policy of requiring privilege
waiver as a method of cooperation. Id. Because DOJ memos do not protect business entities from
interactions with any of these agencies, legislation that would apply to all agencies is a more
effective route to accomplishing more equitable DPAs. Id.
187. Id. (advocating that because the DOJ has not made changes to ensure protection of
business entities and employees, it is up to Congress to pass a law that provides the necessary
protection).
188. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the purpose of
attorney–client privilege is to ―encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice‖); Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Back Against the Wall: Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Through the Lens of Contract “Policing”, 23 CRIM. JUST. 34, 36 (2008) (conceding that
attorney–client privilege is a ―principle[] with strong constitutional, evidentiary, and/or ethical
roots‖).
189. Id.; U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra note 177, at 2–3, 3 n.1. (suggesting that the breakdown
in communication between an employee and the employer‘s counsel is already happening). See
Transcript of Testimony of Susan Hackett, General Counsel, Association of Corporate Counsel,
Before the United States Sentencing Commission (Mar. 15, 2006) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/03_15_06/Hackett-Testimony.pdf (describing the results of a survey
that found privilege erosion occurring in the majority of requests for privilege waiver from U.S.
Attorneys).
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Congressional legislation is paramount to protecting attorney–client
privilege because it will create legally enforceable ethical standards for
prosecutors.190 Congress is the appropriate body to build concrete standards
for prosecutors as it is ―endowed with the constitutional authority to . . .
regulate federal officers . . . . As a national entity, its regulations would
preclude the possibility of disuniformity and lack of guidance.‖ 191
Furthermore, Congress can form neutral groups to study and advise on the
matter and has lobbies on both sides of the issue, thus giving Congress the
least biased and most complete view of the situation. 192
Objections to the DOJ‘s minimalist regulation of prosecutorial conduct
through memos became evident with Senator Arlen Specter‘s introduction of
the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act in 2007 (2007 Act),193 and
reintroduction of the Act in 2008 (2008 Act) 194 and in 2009 (2009 Act). 195
The 2007 Act, passed by the House of Representatives, would protect
attorney–client privilege to preserve the effectiveness of compliance
programs, internal investigations, 196 the workings of the adversarial system of
justice, 197 and ultimately ―place on each agency clear and practical limits
designed to preserve the attorney–client privilege and work product
protections available to an organization and preserve the constitutional rights
and other legal protections available to employees of such an organization.‖ 198
The 2007 Act supports its suggested reforms by noting that ―officers or
employees of Government agencies have been able to, and can continue to,
conduct their work while respecting attorney–client and work product
protections and the rights of individuals, including seeking and discovering
facts crucial to the investigation and prosecution of organizations.‖ 199 The
2008 and 2009 Acts have substantially similar goals to the 2007 Act. 200 The
2008 Act clarifies certain provisions,201 as does the 2009 Act. 202
190. U.S. Attorneys‘ Letter, supra note 177, at 3.
191. Ryan E. Mick, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics Act: Solution or Revolution?, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1251, 1291 (2001).
192. Id.
193. H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007).
194. S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008).
195. S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009).
196. H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. § (2)(a)(4).
197. Id. § (2)(a)(6).
198. Id. § (2)(b).
199. Id. § (2)(a)(5).
200. See S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 445, 111th Cong. (2009).
201. Andrew Gilman, The Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act: The Prospect of
Congressional Intervention into the Department of Justice‟s Corporate Charging Policy, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1100–01 (2008) (explaining that the 2008 Act is more detailed, allows
prosecutors greater flexibility in requesting information from businesses, and clarifies that the
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Passage of the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act is a necessary
step toward a more balanced negotiating process for corporate diversion
agreements. The legislation would reduce the dangers inherent in the current
DPA process, such as coerced privilege waiver, the DOJ‘s unilateral ability to
modify the memos, continually changing DOJ policy, and potential disregard
of employees‘ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Without
congressional legislation of this nature, business entities will have to wait for
a scenario, such as the circumstances attending the KPMG DPA where
prosecutors break already enacted law, before the entity can obtain a legal
remedy.
C. The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act and H.R. 5086
In December 2007, Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr. of New Jersey issued a
―Statement of Principles on Deferred Prosecution Agreements‖ (Statement). 203
The Statement is further evidence of the push from those involved in the DPA
process for more concrete DPA guidelines for prosecutors. In light of
prosecutorial wrongs,204 Congressman Pascrell called for written guidelines
on DPAs to hold federal prosecutors accountable for their actions and for
judicial oversight to introduce a neutral party into the DPA process. 205
Pascrell also implored Congress to relieve federal prosecutors of the
responsibility of selecting the monitor to avoid appearing biased toward the
U.S. Attorney‘s Office.206 Finally, Pascrell asked for full disclosure of DPAs
so that the agreements may be held to public scrutiny. 207
Subsequent to the Statement, Pascrell introduced the Accountability in
Deferred Prosecution Act of 2008 (Accountability Act).208 The 2008 version
government is prohibited from considering privilege waiver in its charging decision).
202. 154 CONG. REC. S2331–32 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Specter)
(explaining subtle changes in the 2009 Act include definition of the term ―organization‖ and other
ambiguities).
203. Office of Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr., Statement of Principles on Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (Dec. 17, 2007), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/
files/statement_of_principles_on_deferred_prosecution_agreements_dec_17_2007.pdf.
204. Id. The Statement cites the terms of the 2005 Bristol-Meyers Squibb Deferred
Prosecution Agreement as an example of a prosecutorial wrong because the terms did not relate t o
the alleged violation. For instance, Bristol-Meyers Squibb removed its chief executive officer and
general counsel at the suggestion of its federal monitor, although the chief executive officer and
general counsel‘s actions were unrelated to the securities fraud allegations that led to Bristol-Meyer
Squibb‘s DPA. Id. The Statement also cites the Zimmer Holdings, Inc. DPA wherein former
Attorney General John Ashcroft was appointed as federal monitor while his former employee was
overseeing the case. Id. Ashcroft earned over $52 million in eighteen months, giving the impression
of ―impropriety and political favoritism‖ in selection of the federal monitor. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. H.R. 6492, 110th Cong. (2008).
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was not passed, but an identical version was reintroduced in 2009. 209 The
focus of the Accountability Act is ―to promote uniformity and to assist
prosecutors and organizations as they negotiate and implement‖ DPAs, and it
requires the Attorney General to ―issue public written guidelines‖ for
DPAs.210 The Accountability Act requests reforms similar to those suggested
in Congressman Pascrell‘s 2007 Statement and elaborates on specific details,
such as circumstances when an independent monitor is warranted, terms and
conditions that may be appropriate for an agreement, a process for
determining authentic cooperation, duration of the agreement, selection and
compensation of the federal monitor, restrictions relating to agreements, the
need for judicial oversight, and public disclosure of agreement terms. 211
Independent of the Accountability Act, Congressman Frank Pallone
introduced H.R. 5086 in 2008, a bill that asks Congress ―[t]o require the
Attorney General to issue guidelines delineating when to enter into deferred
prosecution agreements, to require judicial sanction of deferred prosecution
agreements, and to provide for [f]ederal monitors to oversee deferred
prosecution agreements.‖212 The provisions of H.R. 5086 are similar to the
provisions of the Accountability Act in that they offer guidelines for when to
enter a DPA, provide a definition of cooperation, request judicial oversight of
the DPA process, and present suggestions for monitor selection. 213
Both the Accountability Act and H.R. 5086 demonstrate the growing
sentiment among members of Congress that legislative action is needed to
create stronger guidelines for prosecutors in the DPA process. If passed, these
bills would supplement the Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act by
reducing prosecutorial abuses outside of the privilege issue. As with
privilege, enforceable remedies for businesses are needed regarding the topics
the Accountability Act and H.R. 5086 address, such as circumstances when an
independent monitor is warranted, how agreement terms are to be established,
identifying breach of an agreement, what constitutes cooperation, and
standards for appropriate punishment.
VI. CONGRESS SHOULD REGULATE THE CORPORATE DEFERRED
PROSECUTION PROCESS
As seen through recent judgments, proposed legislation, and memos
issued by the DOJ, there is increasing desire from participants in the DPA
process for regulation of prosecutorial behavior in the DPA context. This

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. (2009).
Id. § 4(a).
See generally id.
H.R. 5086, 110th Cong. (2008).
See generally id.
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concern has been followed by a push to create more stringent guidelines for
prosecutors in corporate DPA procedures.
The evolution of the DPA process, which began with loose regulations
under the Holder Memo and, under the Thompson Memo, permitted
questionable prosecutorial practices that the McNulty Memo subsequently
attempted to remedy, is evidence of the importance of developing enforceable
legal standards for federal prosecutors to follow in DPA negotiations. Each
subsequent DOJ memo brought new reforms and tried to slightly narrow the
scope of prosecutorial power. The DOJ‘s most recent memo, the Filip Memo,
is a step toward tighter regulation of prosecutorial behavior, as it requests
more equitable corporate cooperation standards.214
However, not only is it important that the DOJ attempt to reform
prosecutorial behavior through memo provisions, action also is needed from
Congress to recognize and enforce the current trend toward a regulated
standard for prosecutors. Without congressional oversight, such as the
reforms suggested by the proposed Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act
and the provisions of the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act and H.R.
5086, business entities generally will not have legal remedies to counter a
prosecutor‘s violation of memo provisions, unless a KPMG-like abrogation of
rights occurs.
For instance, despite the McNulty Memo‘s direction to disregard
nondisclosure of attorney–client privileged information when determining
substantial compliance, the AGA Medical Corporation DPA still allowed for
this consideration, as well as disregarded other significant McNulty Memo
directives such as providing clarification in the agreement of how
advancement of legal fees would factor into the substantial compliance
analysis. Thus, while each successive DOJ memo has made ethical
advancements, the advancements are of no worth without a legal mechanism
for enforcement. DOJ memos do not have the requisite strength that enacted
legislation would have to implement legal rights for business entities to ensure
that punishments are related to the alleged crimes, waiver of attorney–client
privilege does not encourage corporations to create employee scapegoats,
nonpayment of employee legal fees does not rise to unconstitutional levels,
and the federal monitor is not inexperienced or faced with a conflict of
interest.
The Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act, if passed, will provide a
good remedy because it would allow businesses to validly assert their rights to
214. Kipnees & Sheikh, supra note 179, at 49 (noting that the Filip Memo brings the DPA
process to a higher ethical standard by discouraging privilege waivers and nonpayment of
employees‘ legal fees as signs of compliance with government investigations, instead looking to the
corporation‘s voluntary disclosure of ―relevant facts and evidence‖).
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attorney–client privilege without fear that this would result in a judgment of
noncooperation. 215 However, attorney–client privilege waiver is not the only
abuse occurring in the DPA process. The only way to truly cure the problems
inherent in today‘s system of deferred prosecutions is for Congress to create
enforceable rights for business entities through direct legislation outlining the
prosecutorial ―do‘s‖ and ―do not‘s‖ of pretrial diversion agreements. Without
regulations from Congress, such as the suggestions in the Accountability in
Deferred Prosecution Act and H.R. 5086 regarding judicial oversight,
definitions of authentic cooperation, and public disclosure of DPA terms,
federal prosecutors still will be permitted to implement or avoid implementing
memo provisions at their discretion, as was the case for Aurora, KPMG, and
AGA.
Just as U.S. Attorneys provide an ethics check on business entities, so too
should congressional regulations provide a check on prosecutorial
performance. Congressional legislation of DPAs will acknowledge that the
agreements are necessary to avoid an Arthur Andersen-like demise when a
DPA is not implemented, as well as to avoid an unsuccessful DPA such as
AIG‘s agreement, wherein change is not realized effectively. Transparency in
prosecutorial conduct will better accomplish the criminal justice system‘s
goals of punishment and deterrence while affecting ethical reform on both
sides of the negotiating table.
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